2 paskaita. Optimalių pinigų sąjungų teorijos kritika


2.1 Kiek svarbūs skirtumai tarp šalių?
   2.1.1 Ar tikėtinas paklausos šokas tik vienoje šalyje?
   2.1.2 Asimetriniai šokai ir nacionalinė valstybė
   2.1.3 Instituciniai darbo rinkų skirtumai
   2.1.4 Skirtingos teisinės sistemos ir finansų rinkos
   2.1.5 Ar augimo tempų skirtumai svarbūs?
2.2 Nominalūs ir realūs valiutos nuvertėjimai
   2.2.1 Devalvacija, kad atsverti asimetrinius paklausos šokus
   2.2.2 Devalvacija, kad atsižvelgti į skirtingas politikos pirmenybes
   2.2.3 Našumas ir infliacija pinigų sąjungoje: Balassa-Samuelson’o efektas
2.3 Devalvacija, suderinamumas laike ir patikimumas
   2.3.1 Barro-Gordon’o modelis: geometrinė interpretacija
   2.3.2 Barro-Gordon’o modelis atvirose ekonomikose
   2.3.3 Patikimumas ir pinigų sąjungos kaštai
2.4 Optimistiškesnis Mundell’as
2.5 Šalių atvirumas ir pinigų sąjungos kaštai
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